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Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is an
emerging viral pathogen that primarily causes respiratory illness. We
conducted a seroprevalence study of banked human serum samples
collected in 2012 from Southern Saudi Arabia. Sera from 300 animal
workers (17% with daily camel exposure) and 50 non-animal-
exposed controls were examined for serological evidence of MERS-
CoV infection by a pseudoparticle MERS-CoV spike protein
neutralization assay. None of the sera reproducibly neutralized the
MERS-CoV-pseudotyped lentiviral vector. These data suggest that
serological evidence of zoonotic transmission of MERS-CoV was not
common among animal workers in Southern Saudi Arabia during
July 2012.
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Introduction
First reported in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in
September 2012, Middle East respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus (MERS-CoV) is now frequently detected and
causing high mortality among persons living or traveling
in the Arabian Peninsula.1 Retrospective testing has
revealed that MERS-CoV was also circulating in Zarqa,
Jordan as early as April 2012, causing at least 2 deaths and
likely 7 close contact infections.2 Since then, virus spread
has seemingly increased. Between April 2012 and May
2014, there have been 536 reports of laboratory-confirmed
human cases of MERS-CoV, of which, 145 (27%) have
perished.3
The majority of the initially reported cases of MERS-
CoV in KSA were sporadic, associated with severe illness,
and diagnosed in tertiary care hospitals.3,4 As surveillance
efforts have expanded, a number of MERS-CoV cases with
milder clinical disease have been recognized. In this study
of archive sera, we sought to examine evidence that
subclinical MERS-CoV infections may have occurred in
early 2012.
Methods
Study population
This study was approved by two institutional review boards
(KSA Ministry of Health and Western IRB). Banked serum
samples were collected using convenience sampling in July
2012 from 300 animal-exposed and 50 non-matched human
controls residing in Jazan region, KSA, as part of a study
investigating human Rift Valley fever exposure. The cross-
sectional, convenience sample of human sera was chosen for
its self-reported exposure to domestic animals, such as
camels, as studies have documented increasing evidence that
camels are a reservoir for MERS-CoV5,6 and human MERS-
CoV infections were later reported in the area.
Sample and data collection
After informed consent was obtained, demographic and
domestic animal exposure data were collected using a struc-
tured questionnaire. Blood samples were then collected and
transported on wet ice to the KSA Ministry of Health (MoH)
laboratory in the Jazan region, KSA. Aliquots of sera were
shipped to the University of Florida for serological assessment.
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Questionnaire data were used to analyze demographic
characteristics and generate animal exposure data. In addi-
tion, an epidemic curve was developed using published
reports to identify the dates of onset for the MERS-CoV cases
in KSA.3,4
MERS-CoV spike pseudoparticle neutralization
assay
A MERS-CoV spike protein pseudotyped lentiviral vector
was constructed and provided by the laboratory of Malik
Peiris of Hong Kong University. This assay is considered to
be a more sensitive test compare to virus neutralization
assay.6,7 The MERS-S pseudoparticles were used in a
pseudoparticle neutralization test (ppNT) as first described
elsewhere.6 In brief, the ppNT assay included infecting
monolayers of Vero E6 cells (ATCC CRL-1586) in a single
well (96-well plate format; 1 9 104 cells/well) with HIV-
MERS-S-pseudotyped lentiviral vector having 5 ng p24. The
MERS-S pseudoparticles were pre-incubated with serially
diluted sera for 60 min at 4°C and then added to the cells in
triplicate. After 2 days of incubation, 100 ll of luciferase
substrate, ONE-Glo luciferase Assay System (Promega Mad-
ison, WI, USA), was added. The relative level of MERS-S
pseudoparticle infection of the cells as luciferase activity was
measured in a BioTek Synergy MX multimode plate reader
(BioTek, Winooski, VT. Endpoint MERS-CoV neutralizing
antibodies titers were determined as the highest serum
dilution resulting in 90% reduction of luciferase relative to a
negative serum (BSA) control. Polyclonal rabbit antisera to
MERS-CoV obtained from the NIH/NIAID Rocky Mountain
Research Laboratory was used as a positive control. Sensi-
tivity of the assay in our laboratory was compared to that of
the Peiris Laboratory at University of Hong Kong, where it
was developed, by shipping an aliquot of this positive control
which was independently titrated in the ppNT assay. Both
our and Peiris’ laboratory found the neutralizing titer of the
polyclonal rabbit sera to be comparable to that measured by
the Rocky Mountain Laboratories live virus neutralization
assay (1:2560).
Results
The study population was predominately male between 15
and 84 years of age, of them, approximately 84% of
participants were between the ages of 20 and 59 years. The
participants were enrolled from the governorates of Abu
Arish, Al Aridah, Al Darb, Al Aydabi, Baish, Dhamad, Fifa,
Jazan, Sabya, and Samtah. A small percentage (16.9%) of
participants reported themselves to be semi-nomadic, with
possible movement outside of the Jazan region. Nearly half
(44%) of participants were from the Jazan Governorate.
Among participants, 25% reported some form of contact
with domestic animals including camels, cattle, horse, goats,
or sheep and 17% reported daily contact with domestic
camels during the 12 months to enrollment (see Table S1).
All serum samples were screened in triplicate at a dilution
of 1:20. A specimen was considered as screening positive if
the average of the three wells containing the sera exhibited a
>50% reduction in luminescence in comparison to the
luminescence negative (BSA) or no serum control. Thirteen
sera (9 animal exposed and 4 controls) screened positive at
1:20, but upon titration of these sera in subsequent assays,
none of them were reproducibly able to neutralize the MERS-
CoV pseudotyped lentiviral vector at a serum dilution of
1:20.
The epidemiological curve of human MERS-CoV cases in
KSA (Figure 1) reflects the occurrence of sporadic cases in
2012, low-level sustained transmission in 2013, and an
epidemic spike between April and May 2014.
Discussion
This study evaluated 350 banked serum samples collected in
July 2012 from individuals with self-reported domestic
animal exposure and controls in Jazan Region, KSA, for
the presence of MERS-CoV neutralizing antibodies. None of
the specimens tested positive using the MERS-S ppNT assay.
Our negative results suggest population naivety to MERS-
CoV infection in this region of KSA 1 month after the first
earliest case was reported in another region of the country.8
At the time samples were collected, there was no known
evidence of human or animal infections with MERS-CoV
from the Jazan region.4 Since then multiple humans in Jazan
have developed MERS-CoV infections.
As the first cases of MERS-CoV were identified, studies
have postulated that camels are likely a reservoir for the virus
in the Middle East.5,6,9,10 Given that 17% of participants of
the animal-exposed participants reported daily contact with
dromedary camels, we would have expected to find some
serological evidence of infection if dromedary MERS-CoV
was readily able to infect humans. Several other studies have
reported similar results where no serological evidence of
MERS-CoV infection was detected in domestic animal-
exposed populations, including abattoir workers in sites
where infected camels have been documented.10,11 During
October 2012, researchers in KSA collected and tested serum
samples from 226 abattoir workers in Jeddah and Makkah.
Using an immunofluorescence assay, none had evidence of
elevated MERS-CoV antibody.11 Similarly, in another 2013
study where nasal swabs from Egyptian camels suggested
MERS-CoV was present, there was no evidence of sero-
positivity among the camelworkerswith intense contact to these
same camels.10 These data are in parallel with the observed
epidemiology of avian influenza H5N1 where serological,
virological or clinical evidence of human infection is rare in
spite of ubiquitous exposure. Perhaps, other mammalian
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species are serving as additional reservoirs for this pathogen
or serving as vectors in transferring infection from camels to
humans. Alternatively, perhaps our assay lacks sensitivity, or
MERS-CoV infection may produce a weak or transient
immune response following mild or asymptomatic infection.
Finally, it is possible that only a subset of the human
population has the predilection to be infected by MERS-
CoV, either because of genetic polymorphisms or unusual
routes of exposure.
Similar to MERS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) virus began causing sporadic self-limited outbreaks
in late 2002, after which it seemingly developed sustained
human-to-human transmission, and spread internation-
ally.12 Post-epidemic studies of SARS have revealed a low-
level circulation of the virus several months before it was first
detected in humans in Guangdong Province of China,
suggesting a period of time in which the virus adapted to
human hosts.13 While it is difficult to draw direct compar-
isons, it seems possible that MERS-CoV is demonstrating a
similar transmission pattern, reflected by the sporadic
outbreaks occurring in 2012, followed by sustained low-level
transmission in 2013, and now showing a larger human
infection KSA wave in 2014 (Figure 1).4 If the epidemiologic
model of SARS is relevant to MERS,13 this current progres-
sion in MERS-CoV ecology may presage much greater future
MERS-CoV epidemics.
There still remain many questions regarding designing
appropriate interventions to prevent or reduce MERS-CoV
transmission. Of them, identification of risk factors for
MERS-CoV infection, a comprehensive understanding of
natural animal reservoirs and vectors, and better determining
transmission pathways seem to be paramount in developing
appropriate interventions. Priority should be given to
addressing these questions if we hope to improve public
health response to future index cases in new geographical
areas. It seems prudent to allocate resources to further
globally enhance surveillance to quickly identify MERS-CoV
and to monitor for viral genetic changes as well as to conduct
the necessary epidemiological studies to fill the aforemen-
tioned gaps in our knowledge regarding this new and
dangerous threat.
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Figure 1. Epidemic curve of the MERS-CoV reported cases by date of onset, from May 1, 2012 to May 11, 2014 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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